Is Donald Trump Ready to Do Business With Myanmar?

A question that would have seemed unthinkable a few years ago

Myanmar has spent much of the past decade as one of the most isolated countries in the world. Since the military seized power in a coup, the country has been gripped by civil conflict, economic collapse and a thicket of Western sanctions targeting the generals, their business networks and the state-linked conglomerates that underpin their rule.

So the question now being asked in Washington, Naypyidaw and across Southeast Asia — whether President Donald Trump is prepared to do business with Myanmar — marks a striking shift in tone. It reflects a broader pattern in Trump’s second-term foreign policy, in which commercial opportunity and transactional diplomacy have often taken precedence over the human rights conditions that shaped previous US approaches to pariah states.

Why Myanmar, and why now?

Several factors make Myanmar an unlikely but not implausible candidate for engagement.

The first is resources. Myanmar sits on significant deposits of rare earth elements, tin, jade and other minerals — materials that have become strategically vital as the United States and China compete over the supply chains behind electric vehicles, defence systems and consumer electronics. Much of Myanmar’s mineral output has historically flowed north into China. Any American interest in changing that calculation would be as much about geopolitics as profit.

The second is China itself. Beijing has deepened its economic and political footprint in Myanmar during the years of Western isolation, financing infrastructure and pipelines that give it access to the Indian Ocean. For an administration that has framed much of its foreign policy around competition with China, leaving Myanmar entirely in Beijing’s orbit carries a strategic cost.

The third is the transnational crime economy. Myanmar’s border regions have become a global hub for online scam compounds that have defrauded victims around the world, including large numbers of Americans. Pressure to dismantle those networks has given Washington a practical reason to open channels with authorities on the ground — and critics warn that such channels can easily blur into legitimisation.

The case against

Opponents of engagement argue that any warming would hand a propaganda victory to a military leadership accused of widespread atrocities, including against the Rohingya, and would undercut the armed and civilian resistance groups that control substantial territory. Sanctions relief, they say, risks funnelling revenue directly to the institutions responsible for the violence.

There is also the practical problem of who, exactly, the United States would be doing business with. Myanmar is not a unified market. Large parts of the country are administered by ethnic armed organisations and resistance administrations, and investment contracts signed in the capital may carry little weight on the ground.

What to watch

The signals to watch are familiar ones: shifts in sanctions designations, the issuing of licences for specific transactions, visits by US officials or business delegations, and the language used about Myanmar’s leadership in official statements. A softening in any of these areas would suggest a genuine recalibration rather than rhetorical drift.

For now, the question remains open. Myanmar’s rulers have long sought international recognition, and an American president who prizes deals over doctrine presents an opportunity they are unlikely to ignore. Whether Washington takes up the offer — and at what price to its stated principles — will say a great deal about how the United States intends to operate in Southeast Asia for the rest of the decade. Read More